Abstract-We consider message-efficient broadcast tolerating Byzantine faults in a multi-hop wireless sensor network. Assuming a grid network where all nodes have a communication range of r, and a single neighborhood contains at most t dishonest and collision-capable (bad) nodes, each with a message budget m f , we investigate the minimum message budget m that each honest (good) node must have in order to achieve reliable broadcast. We consider three cases: (1) m f is known in advance and m is homogeneous among all good nodes; (2) m f is known in advance and m is heterogeneous among good nodes; (3) m f is unknown. For the first two cases, we present possibility results and broadcast protocols that have message costs within twice the lower bound. For the third case, we present a coding scheme that helps verify the integrity of messages at a receiving node without using any cryptographic techniques. This code leads to a reactive local broadcast primitive that has probabilistic reliability guarantees. Combined with a previously proposed scheme, it results in a broadcast protocol for t < 1 2 r(2r +1) that guarantees reliability with high probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the design of sensor networks, the impact of malicious behavior should be taken into account because the sensor nodes are often deployed in unattended and physically insecure environments. The low cost configuration of sensor nodes make traditional measures such as tamper-proof hardware not cost effective, and even standard cryptographic techniques may be too expensive for common devices [12] . Under this constraint, many reliability/security problems arise. In this paper we consider how to achieve reliable broadcast in a message-efficient way in such a network.
In the problem, referred to as BFT-BCAST, there is a base station serving as message source. The task is to deliver the correct message from the base station to all nodes in the network via multi-hop links, despite some faulty or malicious (called bad in this paper) nodes that may alter the message or cause collisions. For low cost consideration, it is desirable to accomplish the task assuming little or even no cryptography (for example, when (re)establishing keys). Assuming a noncollision and non-cryptography setting, Koo [13] first studies this problem and shows the maximum number of bad nodes per neighborhood, t, that can be tolerated by a broadcast protocol. In subsequent work [2] , [3] , Bhandari et al. further prove that Koo's bound is a critical threshold. In [14] , Koo et al. remove the non-collision assumption and show that the maximum tolerable t in a collision network remains the same * Corresponding author.
as in a non-collision setting, provided that the bad nodes are collision-bounded.
We study a similar problem to that of [13] , [2] , [14] , with an emphasis on message efficiency, an important system property that has not been considered previously. We assume that every node, either good or bad, has a total bound on the number of messages it can send. This tries to capture the fact that many network devices (for example the Smart Dust sensors [11] ) are extremely constrained in energy, thus a finite message budget for a node to perform a task or an attack is a realistic assumption. This assumption differs from the one made by Koo et al. [14] which assumes that a bad node is bounded only in the number of collisions it can cause, but not bounded otherwise. The latter condition actually allows a simple treatment of collisions: if a bad node can cause at most β collisions, then a good node can simulate a collisionfree transmission by repeatedly sending every message βt + 1 times. However, it is unclear what will happen if a good node's budget is lower than βt + 1, or whether this βt + 1 budget is necessary at all.
Our aim is to answer the following question: Given the message budget of every bad node m f ∈ N and the maximum number of bad nodes per neighborhood, t, what is the minimum message budget each good node must have for BFT-BCAST to be possible, and if possible, how to achieve that? We show that, when m f is known in advance, then the task can be achieved with a message cost within twice the lower bound, and allowing heterogeneous assignment of message budgets can further reduce average message cost. We also present a probabilistic solution for the case of unknown m f .
Without assuming cryptographic mechanisms, the general approach for a broadcast protocol to overcome Byzantine faults is to send repetitive correct messages that outnumber potential false messages [13] , [2] , [14] , [17] . To account for various kinds of faults, such protocols are often message costly, especially when the fraction of faulty nodes approaches the threshold. Therefore they are often envisioned to be used in some key parts of, rather than for all, communication tasks, such as (re)establishing cryptographic keys and sending message digests. Those parts of communication are particularly sensitive to failures, and thus deserve special care. On the other hand, they are less demanding in traffic, so a relatively heavyweight protocol may be acceptable. Considering the most general application scenarios and also following the line of previous research, our protocols do not use any cryptographic techniques.
A. Related work
Reliable broadcast has been well studied for both pointto-point and radio networks. In [16] , reliable broadcast in an arbitrary graph is considered. Upper and lower bounds in terms of graph theoretic parameters for the feasibility of reliable broadcast are presented, although no exact thresholds are given. Pelc and Peleg [17] consider random transmission failures for both radio and message-passing networks, where each node fails at each step with some constant probability. They establish feasibility conditions and estimate the complexity of almost-safe broadcasting for such a model. One of their assumptions is that a node cannot send different messages to different neighbors, which resembles the characteristics of radio transmission without collisions. A grid network with random but permanent node failures is considered in [4] , [5] . Necessary and sufficient conditions on the required transmission range r as a function of node failure probability are derived. The problem of achieving consensus in a wireless network is studied in [8] .
In [13] , Koo considers achieving reliable broadcast in multihop radio networks in the presence of Byzantine faults. It is shown that the task is impossible for t ≥ 1 2 r(2r + 1) . Bhandari and Vaidya [2] , [3] show that 1 2 r(2r +1) is indeed an exact threshold of t, meaning that the task is always achievable for t < 1 2 r(2r + 1). Bhandari and Vaidya also present the threshold of t for the case of crash-stop failures. In [14] , Koo. et al. additionally allow a bad node to cause a (known) bounded number of collisions, while placing no bound on the number of non-collision-causing messages that can be sent by a node. They show that despite the additional power available to the bad nodes, reliable broadcast remains solvable as long as t < 1 2 r(2r + 1). Concurrent with Koo et al.'s work [14] , Gilbert et al. [10] consider a single-hop and collision-bounded model in which a bad and a good node can send at most β and β messages, respectively. Moreover, β is assumed to be unknown to good nodes in advance, and the source is assumed to be good. Different from this paper, their goal is to characterize the maximum ratio of disruption caused by the adversary to the cost of causing that disruption, and how long the adversary can delay the protocol without even performing a single broadcast. In [9] , the authors place no restrictions on the adversary, which is allowed to disrupt communication and jam the airwaves in an arbitrary and unlimited fashion. Instead, they assume that each of the devices has access to multiple channels of communication. Based on such a model, they present algorithms that achieve -gossip and characterize their complexity.
B. Model and assumptions
The problem is to broadcast a message with value V true from a base station, or source node, at (0, 0) to all nodes in the network. We consider a network model similar to those described in [13] , [2] , [3] , [4] . A total of n nodes are deployed on a grid (each grid cell is a 1 × 1 square). All nodes have an integer transmission radius r. A node's neighborhood is defined as the set of nodes within distance r of that node. We only consider the L ∞ metric, which means that a node's neighborhood is a square of side length 2r centered at itself. When no collision occurs, a message broadcast by a node is correctly received by all nodes within its neighborhood. To avoid edge effect we assume that the network is toroidal, and the network diameter D r. We adopt the locally-bounded adversarial model [13] where any single neighborhood contains t < r(2r + 1) bad nodes. 1 The bad nodes can alter the message and try to trick good nodes into accepting a wrong value. As in [13] , [2] , [3] , [14] , we assume there is a pre-determined time-slotted schedule such that if all nodes follow the schedule then no collision will occur. However, a bad node may deviate from this schedule and cause message collisions. When two nodes perform a local broadcast at the same time, their common neighbor nodes can receive a wrong message, or no message at all, without noticing anything abnormal. Let m and m f be the message budget of a good and a bad node, respectively. We treat the base station as a special node that is not message-bounded.
Let A be a closed area on the plane, denote by (A) and {A} the set of nodes in the interior and on the boundary of A, respectively, and let [A] = (A) ∪ {A}. The set of nodes in a rectangular area {(x, y) : As in [10] , [12] , we assume that the base station is always correct (a compromised base station often means the whole network becoming useless). With this assumption, a protocol is said to achieve broadcast in the network if the following two conditions hold: (1) Completeness: every good node in the network eventually accepts some value, and (2) Correctness: all good nodes accept V true . Notice the difference from traditional definition of successful byzantine fault-tolerant broadcast, which also considers the possibility of a faulty source. This case can actually be handled separately by running a special protocol [14] for achieving agreement first among the source's neighborhood.
C. Contributions
Let m 0 = for any m < m 0 , while it is achievable if m ≥ 2m 0 . This result should be compared with the scheme suggested in [14] which requires m = 2tm f + 1, which is 3) (Unknown m f , Section V) When m f is unknown, then a coding scheme is proposed that helps verify the integrity of message at the receiver without using any cryptographic techniques. Borrowing ideas from AllUnidirectional Error-Detecting coding schemes [6] , [7] , this code leads to the design of a reliable reactive local broadcast primitive, which, combined with the multi-hop protocol proposed in [3] , achieves reliable broadcast for t < 1 2 r(2r + 1) with high probability. This provides a probabilistic solution to an open problem suggested in [14] .
II. A LOWER BOUND OF m FOR RELIABLE BROADCAST
In this section we show an impossibility result for reliable broadcast.
Theorem 1. If m < m 0 , then reliable broadcast is impossible.
Proof: We let the adversary pick a stripe area of height r, extending in the horizontal direction; see an illustration in Figure 1 . In this stripe area, for every interval of 2r +1, which defines a rectangle (see the gray area shown in Figure 1 ), the adversary chooses to corrupt t nodes, starting from the top left node of the rectangle and in a left-to-right and then topto-bottom order. In the figure, the bad nodes are shown in black while the good nodes are in white. We claim that none of the good nodes above the stripe area will be able to accept V true .
We prove this by contradiction. Assume that u is the first node above the stripe area that accepts V true . Then it must be able to make a majority decision from all the messages it receives. It is easy to verify that if u's neighborhood contains any good node from the stripe area (which is the necessary condition for u to ever receive a correct message), then u's neighborhood must cover exactly t bad nodes, and have g ≤ r(2r + 1) − t good nodes in the stripe. In the worst case, the t bad nodes can corrupt up to tm f messages by causing collisions, each resulting in a wrong value being delivered to u. To outnumber the tm f wrong values, u will have to receive at least tm f + 1 correct messages. This means that at least 2tm f + 1 correct messages have to be sent from the g good nodes in u's neighborhood. It follows that every good node has to send at least Therefore, there cannot exist one node above the stripe area that accepts V true , meaning that the broadcast will fail.
Next, we show that m ≥ m 0 does not guarantee reliable broadcast in general. An example is shown in Figure 2 , in which r = 4,
The bad nodes are distributed in the network in such a way that every neighborhood has exactly one bad node. First, the nodes in the neighborhood of the source node will be able to receive sufficient correct messages and accept V true . Then, four additional nodes, in gray and located outside the gray square, can each receive (r(2r + 1) − t) · m = 2065 > 2000 + 1 = 2tm f + 1 messages, thus being able to accept V true . After that, no other good node will be able to receive enough correct messages that outnumber all possible wrong messages. Taking the node p as an example, it has only 33 decided neighbors, each being able to contribute 59 messages. Thus at most 1947 correct messages will be sent to p. The bad node in p's neighborhood, however, can alter up to 1000 messages by causing collisions, leaving only 947 < 1000 copies of correct messages delivered to P . Consequently, p will not be able to tell the correct value from the messages received, and so the broadcast fails.
Generally, in the propagation of V true , the nodes near the corners of the square area that has already accepted V true have the fewest neighbors that can feed them V true , so are the "weakest" under attack. Once we can solve this problem, the broadcast problem will be easy to solve.
III. RELIABLE BROADCAST FOR m ≥ 2m 0
The main result of this section is the following theorem. This result should be compared with the scheme suggested in [14] which requires every good node to have m = 2tm f +1 message budget, which is from its own neighborhood. We first describe a protocol B that uses the condition m ≥ 2m 0 , and then prove that it guarantees reliable broadcast.
A. The protocol B 1) (Broadcast in the neighborhood of source): Initially, the source does a local broadcast of the message 2tm f + 1 times. Each neighbor i of the source accepts the majority value it receives from the source. 2) (Broadcast in the rest of the network): every nonsource node j, upon receiving a value, sends the accepted value
(r(2r+1)−t)/2 times. A node accepts a value once it receives such a value at least tm f + 1 times.
B. Analysis
We show the correctness and completeness of B.
Lemma 1. (Correctness) No good node shall accept a wrong value by following the protocol B.
Proof: If a good node accepts a wrong value v, then following the protocol it must have received v at least tm f +1 times. But it has at most t bad neighbors, each of which can feed it a wrong value m f times, thus it cannot have received more than tm f wrong values. This means that v must indeed be the correct value V true .
The proof of completeness will use the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Define node sets
, and
Proof: First, consider the node set A, as illustrated in Figure 3 (a). For an arbitrary node from A , say P at (x−1, y+ 1), its neighborhood will cover A entirely. Since
, and every good node in A will send the message
(r(2r+1)−t)/2 times, the total number of messages delivered to P will be at least 2tm f +1. These messages could be altered or dropped at most tm f times, resulting in at least tm f + 1 correct messages being delivered to P . Taking a majority of all the received messages P will be able to accept the correct value. The same argument can be applied to all other nodes in [x − 1 . . . x + r, y + 1]. Thus (a) is proved. The case (b) can be proved in a similar way.
Lemma 3. (Completeness) Every good node is eventually able to accept V true .
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction. Base Case: All good nodes in the neighborhood of the source are able to accept V true . This follows trivially since the source broadcasts the correct message 2tm f +1 times, thus being able to deliver at least tm f + 1 correct messages to any node in its neighborhood. Induction: We show that if the neighborhood of a node at 
IV. RELIABLE BROADCAST FOR HETEROGENEOUS m
In this section we show that if nodes are allowed to have heterogeneous message budgets, then the average message cost of good nodes can be substantially reduced. The malicious behavior under consideration is the replacement of good nodes with bad nodes by the adversary, subject to the constraint of t and m f on bad nodes. The source of improvement over the homogeneous case is a more careful analysis of the propagation pattern of V true in the network. In our proof of Theorem 2, and also in a sequence of previous papers [13] , [2] , [14] , the inductive step requires a V true -covered square region to expand into a larger square, so that the entire network can be eventually covered by V true . The main challenge here is for the corner nodes (see Figure 2 ) near that region to accept V true , since they have the fewest good neighbors that can feed them V true . We have shown this to be the obstacle to reliable broadcast when every node has only m = m 0 , and have demonstrated how this can be done with every good node having m = 2m 0 . In this section we consider doing the task with only a fraction of the good nodes having m = 2m 0 while others having m = m 0 .
Our new strategy is to use a circular, rather than a rectangular, area for the "growing body" of the V true -covered region in induction. This strategy in effect eliminates the corner nodes problem: assume the circle is large enough, then any undecided node v adjacent to it has approximately a half neighborhood covered by the circle region, as compared with only a quarter neighborhood coverage in the case of a corner node near a square region. This significantly improves v's (worst-case) chance of accepting V true because it can find more good and decided neighbors that supply V true to them. On the other hand, this strategy requires transition into a geometric context as circles are no longer aligned with the integer nodes. We accomplish this by identifying a series of V true propagation patterns.
We first describe a protocol B heter that runs on a heterogeneous message budget configuration, as illustrated in Figure 5 . In the cross-shaped area, all good nodes have a message budget of m = 1 times. Each neighbor i of the source accepts the majority value it hears from the source. 2) (Broadcast in the rest of the network): every nonsource node j, upon accepting a value, sends the accepted value m times (or m times if in the cross-shaped area). A node accepts a value once it receives that value tm f + 1 times.
B. Analysis
We first show a sufficient condition for V true to propagate to an undecided node.
Lemma 4. If a node p has r(2r + 1) neighbors (either good or bad) that have accepted V true , then p is able to accept
Proof: The node p has at least r(2r +1)− t decided good neighbors, and thus can receive at least m 0 (r(2r + 1) − t) = 2tm f + 1 correct messages, meaning it can accept V true .
Next we describe a basic propagation pattern of V true in the network. First we introduce several concepts. Define a committed line, denoted L(ρ, P 0 , P l ), l ≥ 1, where ρ ∈ Z and −r ≤ ρ ≤ 0, as a line segment such that: (1) its slope is ρ/r; (2) its left and right endpoints are two integer nodes P 0 = (x 0 , y 0 ) and P l = (x l , y l ), respectively; (3) it contains a sequence of intermediate nodes P i = (x 0 + ir, y 0 + iρ), 0 < i < l; (4) let the line containing it be y = f (x), then the good nodes in the area {(x, y) : x 0 ≤ x ≤ x l and f (x)−2r ≤ y ≤ f (x)}, called the back area, have all accepted V true . In Figure 6 , the line segment P 0 P 4 is a committed line. The (shaded) back area A is a parallelogram sharing one edge with P 0 P 4 and having a height of 2r.
A generalized form of a committed line is called a shifted committed line, which is the same as the former except that its two endpoints are not necessarily integer nodes and whose back area is defined as {(x, y) :
A further generalization is the float committed line, which does not necessarily contain the sequence of integer nodes P i = (x 0 + ir, y 0 + iρ), 0 ≤ i ≤ l. In Figure 6 , if P 0 P 4 is moved along the line containing it so that either P 0 or P 4 becomes a non-integer node, then P 0 P 4 becomes a shifted committed line; furthermore, if P 0 P 4 (together with its back area) is moved to an arbitrary position in the plane, then P 0 P 4 becomes a float committed line.
The basic V true propagation pattern is as follows.
Lemma 5. (Basic
Proof: Refer to Appendix A. In the following, we derive several variants of this propagation pattern that are increasingly easier to utilize in a continuous domain. Due to space reasons, the proofs are omitted here.
Let L(ρ, P 0 , P l ), l > 3 be a committed line. Draw a line with slope (ρ + 1)/r from P 1 , and a line with slope (ρ − 1)/r from P l−l , which intersect at v 0 , called L's frontier. Recall that [A] represents the node set in the interior and on the boundary of the closed area A.
Lemma 6. (Committed line propagation pattern) Given a committed line
Let EE be a shifted committed line (Figure 7 (a)) with slope ρ and whose length is larger than 4 ρ 2 + r 2 . Let u 0 and u 1 be two points on EE such that |Eu 0 | = |E u 1 | = 2 r 2 + ρ 2 . Draw a line with slope (ρ + 1)/r from u 0 , and a line with slope (ρ − 1)/r from u 1 , which intersect at v 1 , called EE 's frontier.
Lemma 7. (Shifted committed line propagation pattern) Given a committed line
Let EE be a float committed line (Figure 7 (b)) with slope ρ and whose length is larger than 6 ρ 2 + r 2 . Let w 0 and w 1 be two points on EE such that |Ew 0 | = |E w 1 | = 3 r 2 + ρ 2 . Draw a line with slope (−ρ + 1)/r from w 0 , and a line with slope (−ρ−1)/r from w 1 , which intersect at v 2 , called EE 's frontier.
Lemma 8. (Float committed line propagation pattern)
Given a float committed line L(ρ, P 0 , P l ), l > 3 with w 0 , w 1 , v 2 as specified above, then
;;; ;;; ;;; Define an expanding line as a line segment with a slope h ∈ (−1, 0). Assume ρ/r ≤ h < (ρ + 1)/r, where ρ ∈ Z and −r < ρ < 0. Figure 8(a) shows an example in which the expanding line EE lies between two float committed lines: EE 1 with slope ρ/r, and EF with slope (ρ + 1)/r.
Lemma 9.
Assume an expanding line EE sufficiently long and with a slope ρ/r ≤ h < (ρ + 1)/r, where ρ ∈ Z and −r < ρ < 0. Draw a line segment EE 1 of length 37r with slope ρ/r, and a line segment E E 1 of length 37r from E with slope (ρ + 1)/r, both beneath EE . Then either EE 1 or E E 1 's frontier is above EE , with a distance to EE (i.e., distance to its projection on EE ) d > 1.25.
Proof: Refer to Appendix B. Lemma 9 is used to prove the following result. Proof: Refer to Appendix C. Figure 5 have accepted V true , then [C] , where C is the circle of radius R = 550r 2 centered at the source node, will accept V true .
Lemma 11. If all nodes in the cross-shaped area shown in
Proof: Following the same argument as for Lemma 3, we know that all the nodes in the cross area will accept V true . Consider a committed line E 1 E 1 , as illustrated in Figure 5 . By Lemma 5, E 1 E 1 will yield a new committed line F F , where F and F are two nodes at the edge of the cross area. Since F F extends into the cross area, the extended line segment E 2 E 2 , where E 2 is a node on the y-axis and one unit above E 1 , and E 2 is a node on the x-axis and one unit right after E 1 , is a committed line. By induction and symmetry, all the nodes in the square of side length ≥ 778r 2 will accept V true . Thus all nodes within the circle of radius R = 550r 2 centered at the source node will accept V true .
With the above message budget configuration, V true is
2 log n + log t + log m (sub-bits) a transmission unit bit level sub-bit level Fig. 9 . The two-level encoding scheme.
guaranteed to "fill" the cross-shaped area, and so the rest of the network can accept V true . Theorem 3 then follows from Lemmas 11 and 10, with similar correctness and completeness arguments to those of Theorem 2.
V. RELIABLE BROADCAST WHEN m f IS UNKNOWN
In this section we consider reliable broadcast when m f is unknown. Different from some previous work (e.g., [8] , [10] ) in which some form of collision detector is required, we do not assume collision detection capability of the nodes. As a result, a receiving node cannot distinguish between a collision and the absence of transmission. In other words, the adversary has the ability to "cancel out" a message transmission (by, for example, predicting the shape of signal and sending an inverted signal [7] ), without being noticed by the receiver. This generalization makes reliable broadcast more difficult because it is not obvious how transmission feedback can be exploited. The first challenge we face is therefore to make local broadcast reliable.
We provide a probabilistic solution to this first problem. We say that the broadcast is successful with a high probability if it succeeds with probability at least 1 − n −1 , where n is the network size. Assume that the broadcast message has k bits,
The good nodes know a very loose upper bound m max for the bad nodes' budget. This bound may be an estimate of a practical device's energy limit, and may well be orders of magnitude higher than the real m f . This bound is so loose that using the previous protocols with this knowledge is practically meaningless.
At the heart of our protocol is an encoding/decoding scheme that can detect errors when the message has been altered by the adversary through collisions. The idea is borrowed from All-Unidirectional Error-Detecting codes [6] , [7] which are used in situations where it is possible to flip, for example, a bit from "0" to "1" but not vice-versa (except with a negligible probability). With such a code, the receiver is able to detect any number of bit-flipping errors.
The encoding is performed at two levels: bit-level and subbit-level (see Figure 9) . A message is encoded into a sequence of bits, and each bit into a sequence of L sub-bits. As the basic transmission unit, a sub-bit has two states, and −, which represent the presence and absence of a signal (or a strong and weak signal) for a duration of a time slot, respectively. In the code, every bit 0 is represented by a sequence of −'s, while every 1 by a sequence of random sub-bits. At the receiver side, any such sequence containing at least one will be interpreted as a 1. This mechanism has the following consequence: the adversary can easily flip a 0 bit to 1, by inserting a in the sub-bit sequence of 0, but has some difficulty to turn a 1 into a 0, because to do so it has to know exactly which sub-bits are 's and which are −'s. Taking one for − will leave one intact in the sequence, while taking one − for will lead to a transmission of signal that has nothing to cancel out, thereby generating a new sub-bit. Either will lead to the receiver decoding the sequence into a 1, which is correct. Due to the randomness of sub-bit generation for 1, guessing the whole sequence correctly will be increasingly difficult when the sequence length grows. In our design, L = 2 log n + log t + log m max , which makes the attack success probability be p biterr = 2 −L = 1 n 2 tmmax . At the bit-level, the coded message consists of the original message, denoted by S 0 , with the appendix of a series of segments S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S l . The lengths of these segments are k 0 = k, k 1 , . . . , k l , respectively, and satisfy k i = log k i−1 + 1. The segment S i holds the number of 1 bits in the preceding segment S i−1 . The last two segments S l−1 and S l each has two bits. It is easy to see that the last segment S l can only be 01 or 10. At the receiver side, a node can verify the integrity of a message by checking the number of 1's in each segment. Since the adversary is only able to change 0 to 1 (except with a very small probability), and to maintain the consistency of bit 1 counting across the segments, any such changes will result in further changes, from the segment where the first changes take place through all segments until S l . For S l , the only change the adversary can possibly make is to turn one 0 into 1, resulting in the code 11. However, this code cannot happen in a correct code because the segment S l−1 can have at most two 1 bits. Therefore, once a message has been tampered with, the receiver will be able to detect an error almost surely, with a probability at least 1 − p biterr .
Let K = l i=0 k i be the coded message length for an original message of k bits, then transmitting a message takes K · L consecutive time slots. We define such a sequence of time slots as a message round. With the error detecting code, it is possible to realize a reliable local broadcast primitive with probabilistic guarantees. The local broadcast uses a negative acknowledge (NACK) message, which has the same length as a normal message, but with different content that is understood by the protocol. When a receiver detects an error in the message, it broadcasts an NACK message to its neighborhood. The receipt of an NACK message, either correct or corrupt, indicates a transmission failure. Upon detecting a failure, the sender re-transmits the message. A node repeats transmitting a message until it receives no NACK messages in subsequent consecutive (2r + 1)
2 − 1 message rounds. In the worst case, a node needs to transmit a message tm f times to deliver V true to all its neighbors, with a probability at least
Having made local broadcast reliable, we can now run the protocol proposed in [3] on top of our reactive local protocol to achieve reliable multi-hop broadcast. This protocol can tolerate up to 1 2 r(2r + 1) − 1 bad nodes per neighborhood. We call the combined protocol B reactive . Regarding the message overhead of good nodes, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.
In the protocol B reactive , any good node needs to transmit no more than m = 2(tm f + 1)(2 log n + log t + log m max )(k + 2 log k + 2) times, where t < 1 2 r(2r + 1), to achieve reliable broadcast with a probability at least 1 − n −1 .
Proof:
At the message level, a node needs at most tm f +1 transmissions to make sure that every neighbor receive an integral message with probability at least 1 − n −2 . Before it receives the message, it may need to transmit up to tm f + 1 negative acknowledge messages. So a node may transmit 2(tm f + 1) times in the worse case. Every message involves KL sub-bits, each of which may need one transmission. Observe that K = k + log k +1+ log( log k +1) +1+· · · ≤ k +2 log k +2. Hence in total a node needs to transmit at most m = 2(tm f + 1)(2 log n + log t + log m max )(k + 2 log k + 2) to ensure reliable broadcast with probability at least 1 − n −2 . Considering the network diameter D < n, the whole network broadcast will succeed with probability at least 1 − n −1 . Comparing Theorem 4 with the results in previous sections, one can see that when m f is unknown, good nodes need a much higher message budget to achieve reliable broadcast than when m f is known. This is to be expected since without the knowledge of the adversary's capability, one has to make the worse case estimate when dealing with attacks.
In comparison with the I-code proposed in [7] , our scheme has a lower coding overhead, since for a message of length k, our scheme generates a code of length k + O(log k), whereas I-code yields a length 2k. On the other hand, our scheme has a higher per-attack penalty since the integrity verification is on a message basis, which means that every bit flipping attack from the adversary causes the whole message to be re-transmitted, while the I-code verifies message bit by bit, meaning that only the flipped bit needs to be re-transmitted. Final comparison on message efficiency thus calls for a refined model that takes into account message length and per-message attack rate. This might be a subject of future study.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the problem of reliable broadcast tolerating Byzantine faults in a message-bounded radio network. Given the communication range, the message bounds of nodes, and the maximum number of faulty nodes per neighborhood, we show how large m should be in order for broadcast to be reliable.
For the homogeneous case of m, the presented results leave an uncertain region of m ∈ (m 0 , 2m 0 ) for which it is unclear whether the broadcast task is possible. It is therefore of interest to investigate tighter bounds for this problem. Allowing probabilistic placement of bad nodes in the network as in [4] may be another topic of future research.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof: (Sketch) The proof is by induction. During the process of L(ρ, P 1 , P l−1 ) being moved upward (by at most one unit), L will encounter a series of nodes. Assume that L's moved distance from its original position is h i (0 ≤ i ≤ s) when it encounters nodes for the ith time; at such a position it is denoted L hi . We first show that all nodes met by L for the first time, that is, at h 1 , are able to accept V true . Consider a node b 1 on L h1 , as shown in Figure 6(b) . b 1 's neighborhood a 1 a 2 a 3 a 4 is shown as a square, some other nodes are also labelled in the figure. The gray area is between L h0 and L h1 and therefore does not contain any nodes.
Let the polygon formed by the sequence of nodes b 1 b 2 a 3 a 4 b 4 b 3 be P, shown as a thick (red) dashed polygon in Figure 6 (b). Let X be the number of nodes within and at the boundary of P excluding b 1 b 2 . Then it can be shown that X = r(2r + 1), which means that b 1 has at least r(2r + 1) decided neighbors. By lemma 4 we know that b 1 is able to accept V true . Other nodes on L h1 can be shown to be able to accept V true in a similar way.
The above argument can be applied to nodes on L hi+1 as well, assuming all nodes met by L before h i+1 are decided. This will prove that all nodes on L hi+1 are able to accept V true . Therefore, all nodes on L hi , 0 ≤ i ≤ s will accept V true . This proves the lemma.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 9
Proof: (Sketch) Let 1 = E 1 EE , 2 = E EF, 3 = E 1 EF and 4 = E 1 E E, as depicted in Figure 8 
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 10
Proof: Assume an expanding line EE of length 74r whose end points are both on the circle C (see Figure 8(d) ). Draw a ray from (0, 0) that is perpendicular to EE , and intersects with EE and C at H and H 1 , respectively. By Lemma 9, the float committed line EE 1 of length 37r right below EE has a frontier point above EE . Now move EE 1 , together with its frontier v 2 , along EE until E reaches H, then the trajectory of v 2 will form a line segment v 2 v 2 . Assume that the ray OH intersects with v 2 v 2 at H 2 . By Lemma 8, all nodes, if there are any, on the line segments HH 2 are decided.
Let L = |EE |. It can be verified that |HH 1 | = R − R 2 − |EE | 2 /4 < 0.72 < 1.25 < |HH 2 |, which means that H 2 is outside C. Let δ = 1.25 − |HH 1 | > 0.53. Now move the expanding line EE along the circle C, with EE 's endpoints remaining in touch with C, and subject to the slope constraint of an expanding line. During this process, |HH 1 | will remain the same, so H 1 H 2 will remain no less than δ. The trajectory of H 1 H 2 therefore will sweep over a belt area in which all nodes will be decided, as shown as a shaded region in Figure 8(d) . Note this belt region does not include the boundary line segment P P , where P (resp. P ) is the intersection point between the line y = x(x > 0) and C (resp. C ). By Lemma 7, it is easy to see that all nodes, if there are any, on P P are decided. Similarly, QQ , where Q (resp. Q ) is the intersection point between the line (x = 0, y > 0) and C (resp. C ), will be decided. By symmetry, the nodes in the ring of width δ outside and adjacent to C will be able to accept V true , which means that all nodes in [C ] will accept V true .
